4.1 Identifying credit risk: counterparty, issuer, concentration
▼The definition and the goal syllabus 4.1.1
Credit risk is the risk of loss caused by the failure of a counterparty or issuer to meet its obligations. The party owing the obligation is the obligor. The goal of credit risk management is to maximise a firm's risk-adjusted rate of return by keeping credit exposure within acceptable parameters. The original Basel Accord focused on credit risk because of its primary importance in many institutions' risk profiles. Techniques can be applied to a counterparty, an industry or a country, since default likelihood is strongly correlated with industry success and a home country's economy.
Counterparty risk vs issuer risk syllabus 4.1.1 - 4.1.2
| Form | Meaning | Workbook examples |
|---|---|---|
| Counterparty risk | A counterparty (one of the parties to a transaction, buyer or seller) fails to fulfil its contractual obligations | A customer fails to repay a loan; a company doing business with the bank goes bankrupt before paying; a broker fails to deliver, or delivers late, a bond the bank bought; a broker agrees to buy shares, credits the client, and the client goes bankrupt before delivering; a bank's mortgage customers default |
| Issuer risk | The issuer of a bond or debt instrument defaults on coupons or principal | A fixed income fund holding corporate bonds: if an issuer defaults, coupons stop and the fund's returns fall |
The same bond purchase can carry both. If the broker fails to deliver a bond from a good issuer, that is counterparty risk. If the broker delivers exactly as required but the issuing company goes bankrupt and stops paying interest, that is issuer risk.
Concentration risk syllabus 4.1.1
Concentration risk comes from an uneven distribution of exposures:
- Single-name concentration: over-dependence on a small number of issuers or counterparties. If any default, revenues could drop significantly.
- Sectoral concentration: uneven exposure within industry sectors and geographical regions. If the country or sector a bank is concentrated in suffers a downturn, its revenues suffer relative to better-diversified competitors.
4.2 Exposure sources, settlement, systemic risk + boundary issues
▼Where credit exposure arises syllabus 4.1.2
For most banks loans are the largest source of credit risk, but exposure also arises in the banking book and trading book, on and off the balance sheet: commitments and guarantees, interbank transactions, financial instruments (futures, options, swaps, bonds) and the settlement of these and other transactions.
| Firm | Typical credit exposure |
|---|---|
| Fixed income fund | Issuer credit risk on bonds and corporate debt held |
| Broker | Counterparty credit risk when trading with clients (e.g. a client fails to deliver shares it sold) |
| Bank | Counterparty credit risk when it issues mortgages to retail customers |
Settlement risk vs pre-settlement risk syllabus 4.1.2
| Risk | When | Workbook example |
|---|---|---|
| Settlement risk | At the point buyer and seller exchange instrument and cash: one party delivers, the other fails to | A forward exchanging euros for US dollars: on the maturity date the investment company pays euros but, because of time differences, the foreign bank's dollar payment is delayed. Ideally both transfers happen at the same time, which electronic settlement systems aim for, but the mechanism can fail |
| Pre-settlement risk | Before settlement: an institution defaults where the instrument has a positive economic value to the other party | An interest rate swap (fixed vs floating payments on a specified principal amount): if rates move in favour of counterparty A, B owes a net obligation, and B's failure to perform creates pre-settlement risk for A |
Systemic risk in a credit context syllabus 4.1.2
Systemic risk is a possible breakdown of the entire financial system, not just one firm, arising from close interlinkages and feedback loops that can turn minor events into major crises. The workbook's contrast:
| Case | What happened | Systemic? |
|---|---|---|
| Northern Rock | UK bank that borrowed cheaply on short-term interbank markets and turned it into long-term mortgages. The US housing credit crisis made banks withdraw from interbank lending. It failed in 2007-08, the first UK banking failure caused by deposit withdrawals for 140 years | Part of a system-wide loss of trust |
| Barings (1995) | Failed through a rogue trader's losses; bankrupt but no wider crisis because the causes were unique to that institution | No contagion |
Firms should form their own strategies rather than rely on governments to prevent systemic failure.
Credit risk boundary issues (Basel) syllabus 4.1.3
Basel identifies operational "boundary" risks to consider when banks develop their credit administration:
| Driver | Boundary risk |
|---|---|
| Internal processes | Efficiency and effectiveness of credit administration: management policies and procedures for monitoring documentation, controls over back-office procedures, contractual requirements, legal covenants, collateral management |
| Systems | Accuracy and timeliness of credit risk information supplied to management information systems |
| People | Adequate segregation of duties |
4.3 Measuring: exposure, premium, ratings
▼Credit exposure syllabus 4.2.1
Credit exposure is the amount that can potentially be lost if a debtor defaults; it assesses severity for counterparties and portfolios. It has two parts:
| Part | Meaning | Difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| Current exposure | The obligation currently outstanding | Normally fairly straightforward to calculate |
| Potential future exposure | Estimate of likely loss at some future point | Harder: credit facilities are often not drawn until the company is in trouble, and instruments' future values depend on circumstances not yet arisen (e.g. rate changes). Usually estimated with statistical techniques such as VaR |
Credit rating agencies: role and recognition syllabus 4.2.2
- There are more than 75 ratings agencies worldwide, many specialising in regions or areas of credit finance.
- The Basel Accord introduced a ratings-based method for credit risk in the standardised approach, and the Basel Committee defined guidelines for national regulators to recommend permissible agencies.
- UK regulators nominated: Fitch, Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P) and DBRS. Germany's Bundesbank nominated those four plus the Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCRA).
- Official recognition added to their influence, and investors relied heavily on the ratings. The workbook also cites Saudi Arabia's regulation of agencies' conduct.
- Moody's, S&P and Fitch use similar but not identical letter scales (AAA is S&P's highest). By market convention, AAA to BBB = investment grade and BB to D = speculative grade. These are conventions and imply no recommendation of a security.
Merits and limitations of ratings syllabus 4.2.3
Merits: a useful way for lenders to judge borrowers. Sovereign ratings reflect a country's economic conditions (foreign, public and private investment, capital market transparency, foreign currency reserves) and political conditions (stability, stability through transitions). Institutional investors and banks often use them as a prerequisite when deciding whether to look at companies, industries and securities in that country. Long-term ratings assess a company's ability to meet responsibilities across all its securities; short-term ratings focus on specific securities' ability to perform given current financial condition and industry conditions.
Limitations:
- A rating measures credit quality only, not the risk of a fall in market value or liquidity prospects. Before the credit crunch many investors treated it as if it were, and relied on ratings rather than their own analysis.
- A rating is an opinion (an expert one).
- Slow downgrades: the workbook says Enron stayed investment grade until four days before bankruptcy, though agencies had known of problems for months. But ratings would lose stability if they tracked every market move.
- Conflicts of interest: too familiar a relationship with company management, and a model where the receiver of the rating pays for it.
- Errors on structured products: AAA ratings on structured debt later downgraded or defaulted; Fitch, Moody's and S&P publicly admitted they had not anticipated the credit crunch.
- Over-correction in 2008-09: investment-grade ratings cut straight to speculative on an unprecedented scale though many bonds did not default; agencies accused of becoming too conservative, causing surges in banks' capital charges, because capital requirements depend on the rating.
4.4 Expected loss: PD, EAD, LGD, RR
▼The expected loss formula syllabus 4.2.4
| Term | Unit | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| PD probability of default | % | Likelihood a borrower (or group) fails to pay what is owed; estimated from historical experience and empirical evidence. Higher PD = higher interest rate charged |
| EAD exposure at default | Amount | The amount the bank will be exposed to at the point of a potential default: may differ from today's exposure, e.g. facilities with undrawn commitments include an estimate of future lending before default |
| LGD loss given default | % | The percentage of the actual amount NOT mitigated by, e.g., guarantees or collateral |
| RR recovery rate | % | Amount likely to be recovered (recovery value) as a percentage; RR = 100% - LGD |
Maturity: EAD depends on maturity (time to completion). The longer the time to maturity, the larger the chance credit quality falls, as the obligor has more opportunity, and perhaps need, to draw the remaining credit line.
- 1 LGD = actual loss / amount lent = 300 / 500 = 60%.
- 2 RR = 100% - LGD = 100% - 60% = 40% (about $200 million recovered).
- 3 EL = PD × EAD × LGD = 2% × $500m × 60% = $6 million.
4.5 Credit events, wrong way risk, NPAs, limits, model limitations
▼Credit events syllabus 4.2.4
A credit event is a recognised industry trigger point telling firms a credit risk has materialised, triggering actions by the bank and other creditors. It has no precise definition but commonly includes bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership, or a failure to meet payment obligations when due. It can also be simply a credit-rating downgrade.
Wrong way risk syllabus 4.2.4
ISDA defines wrong way risk (or exposure) as the risk that occurs when exposure to a counterparty is adversely correlated with that counterparty's credit quality. It is missed if creditworthiness and exposure are modelled independently.
Example: accepting securities issued by the counterparty (or related entities) as collateral against that counterparty's default. The closer the counterparty gets to default, the lower the value of its equities, so the less cover they give, exactly when cover is needed.
Non-performing assets syllabus 4.2.4
Non-performing assets are loans whose repayments are not being made on time. A short delay makes a loan past due; once payments are "really late" (usually 90 days) it is classified non-performing. A high level versus similar lenders, or a sudden increase, may signal problems, but judge it in context: banks lending to higher-risk customers tend to have more non-performing debt and compensate with higher interest rates, and a secured loan default is less concerning than an unsecured one because the security can be sold to recover the loss.
Credit limits syllabus 4.2.5
- Credit limits are maximum limits for all aspects of credit exposure, set for individual borrowers, counterparties, and groups of connected counterparties. Better quality counterparty = higher limit, often based partly on internal risk rating.
- Every institution sets them (bank, derivative dealer, fund manager, credit card company). They help keep credit granting adequately diversified.
- Limits on trading book and off-balance-sheet activity are particularly effective for the overall credit risk profile and for linking to risk appetite.
- Set limits also for industries or sectors, regions and products, and possibly a total limit for all corporate lending.
- To be effective, limits should be binding and not driven by customer demand.
- Trap: it is tempting to limit only lower-rated firms and lend without limit to higher-rated ones, but that increases concentration risk.
Limitations of credit risk measurement syllabus 4.2.6
| Limitation | Issue |
|---|---|
| Simplified potential exposure | Potential exposure of a portfolio is generally greater than its current exposure; charges as percentages of notional amounts oversimplify, and notionals do not always measure true credit risk |
| No recognition of time period | Default risk rises as exposure time increases, not always accounted for |
| No recognition of diversification | Diversification significantly reduces overall credit risk but calculations may ignore it |
| Probabilities are a best guess | Based on past information, so PD can be miscalculated |
4.6 Mitigation I: underwriting, guarantees, netting, collateral, diversification
▼Underwriting standards and guarantees syllabus 4.3.1
| Tool | Key points |
|---|---|
| Underwriting standards | The standards applied to borrowers to evaluate creditworthiness: review cash flow and financial statements; earnings, profit margin and outstanding debt; industry variables (competitive pressures, product cycles, growth potential); and controlling loan terms (limit loan size, repayment schedule, extra collateral for higher risk loans) |
| Guarantees | A strong-finance third party guarantees a debt (bond issuers, or smaller companies getting bank loans). The investor relies on the guarantor's creditworthiness and so takes counterparty risk on the guarantor. The borrower pays a cost but may gain lower-cost funding |
Netting agreements syllabus 4.3.1
A netting agreement lets two parties who exchange multiple cash flows on a day agree bilaterally to net them to one payment per currency. It reduces settlement risk, transaction costs and communication costs. To actually reduce risk, agreements must be sound and legally enforceable.
The workbook's three-party example (A, B, C) shows the effect: if party C defaults with no netting, replacement costs would be £4m for A and £6m for B; with a netting agreement between each pair, they fall to £2m for A and £3m for B. Central counterparties also boost the scope for netting.
Collateral syllabus 4.3.1
Collateral is an asset held by a lender on behalf of an obligor, on agreed conditions, as security for a loan: a physical asset (a house securing a mortgage), cash or securities. It works like insurance to reduce exposure, and on default the lender may retain it. It is used for FX forwards, securities lending and derivatives.
| Arrangement | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Unilateral | One party gives collateral to the other |
| Bilateral | Two-sided obligations (swap, FX forward): both may post collateral for the value of their total obligation |
| Netted | Only the net obligor posts collateral, for just the net obligation |
In a typical arrangement the collateral is periodically marked to market (revalued at current prices) and the amount adjusted.
Diversification syllabus 4.3.1
Spread the portfolio across borrowers in different, negatively correlated sectors with an inverse economic relationship. When one sector is in a downturn and its borrowers default, another may be booming, so earnings on some loans offset losses on others. The "highs" are lower and the "lows" are not as low, so the volatility of returns is lower. It helps avoid unacceptable concentrations.
4.7 Mitigation II: CDS, CDOs, securitisation, CCPs + haircut
▼Credit derivatives and the credit default swap (CDS) syllabus 4.3.1
Credit derivatives derive value from an underlying loan or loans; the two most common are the CDS and the CDO. In a CDS the protection buyer pays a periodic or one-off fee (typically in basis points of the notional) to the protection seller, who pays out if a credit event occurs to the reference entity or reference asset. It resembles insurance.
Uses: buy or sell a form of insurance; improve diversification by cutting concentrations; customise exposure to another party without a direct relationship; transfer credit risk without harming the customer relationship. It also exposes the user to operational, counterparty, liquidity and legal risks.
Workbook example: Institution B buys bonds from Customer C (reference entity). B pays Institution A a fee for the life of the swap. If C defaults on a credit event, A pays B the default amount and the swap terminates. A assumes the credit risk, and B is now exposed to counterparty risk on A.
CDOs, loan sales and securitisation syllabus 4.3.1
| Item | Meaning |
|---|---|
| CDO | Like a CDS it shifts risk of an underlying debt instrument from lender to investor, but for a series of loans or bonds from many borrowers, achieving diversification because losses on one are absorbed by gains on non-defaulters |
| Loan sale | Lender sells loans to another institution for an immediate lump sum instead of relying on the income stream |
| Securitisation | The originator owns the assets; an issuer (often a special purpose vehicle, SPV) acquires them and issues bonds to finance the purchase; loan income repays bondholders. The SPV holds the pool separately, so if the originator goes bankrupt the transferred assets are unaffected. Pools are often rated so a lower-rated originator can access cheaper debt capital markets, because a pool can attract a higher rating than the originator |
The downside (2007-08): sub-prime mortgages were mixed with higher-rated ones in complex CDOs that earned higher ratings than the parts warranted, then re-cut and sold on. When rates rose in 2007 and sub-prime loans defaulted, the quality of securitisations could not be judged and demand collapsed. Institutions reliant on securitisation for funding were early casualties as inter-bank trust evaporated.
Central counterparties (CCPs) syllabus 4.3.1
A CCP (clearing house) is used by many exchanges to reduce credit risk. It acts as guarantor of all transactions, sitting as a simultaneous counterparty to each side, so members do not assume each other's credit risk; if one member defaults the clearing house guarantees performance to the other. CCPs also increase the scope for netting. To do this they need significant resources, from capital supplied by members, fees generated by the exchange, or other parties with no direct relationship to the market.
Collateral adequacy calculation: the haircut syllabus 4.3.2
When an investment manager lends stock (e.g. to firms wanting short positions), the borrower lodges collateral, often government bonds or other high-quality liquid assets. If the collateral's price falls while the stock is on loan, a default could leave the lender short, so an extra amount, a haircut, is added, depending on the collateral's volatility (for government bonds, say 3%).
- 1 Value lent = $100m.
- 2 Haircut amount = $100m × 3% = $3m.
- 3 Collateral = $100m + $3m = $103m.
4.8 The credit risk function, Basel stages, scoring, stress tests, internal ratings
▼The credit risk management function and escalation syllabus 4.3.3 - 4.3.4
The function ensures credit risk is properly managed, but does not own any risk itself. Duties include:
- owning the credit policy and ensuring adherence
- setting, monitoring and reviewing credit limits
- assessing potential credit risk events
- ensuring credit-granting decisions are made independently of the trading areas
- measuring and monitoring daily credit exposure, providing information for capital adequacy assessment
- credit analysis by counterparty, country, sector and instrument or product (which may include KYC checks)
The role varies by firm type: a bank trading for its own account can apply some limits across the board, while each fund in an investment manager can have a different risk appetite. Firms also need procedures and systems to monitor individual and grouped counterparties, with criteria for escalating potential credit issues to senior management. Problem areas need more frequent monitoring and possibly corrective action, classification and/or provisioning.
Basel: board, senior management and measurement syllabus 4.3.5
- The board approves and reviews (at least annually) the credit risk strategy and significant credit risk policies, reflecting risk tolerance and expected profitability.
- Senior management implements the strategy and develops policies and procedures to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk across all activities.
- Policies must be communicated, implemented via procedures, monitored and periodically revised. Banks should quantify risk for individual borrowers and analyse at product and portfolio level to spot sensitivities or concentrations.
- Measurement should consider: (1) the nature of the credit and its conditions (maturity, reference rate); (2) the exposure profile to maturity relative to market movements; (3) collateral or guarantees, including any added counterparty risk; (4) potential default based on internal risk rating.
- Techniques should suit the complexity and risk, use robust data and be subject to periodic validation: data quality assurance, model validation review, reviews of model assumptions.
The learning objective lists the stages as development, validation, approval, implementation, review and post-implementation monitoring; the workbook text covers them through the points above.
Credit scoring and factor inputs syllabus 4.3.6
Retail scoring: questionnaires and standard application forms, scored, using questions such as age, credit history, amount owed, occupation, years in current job, and home owner or renting. Firms are scored with three groups of factor inputs:
| Input type | Examples |
|---|---|
| Financial | Earnings, cash flow, asset values, liquidity, leverage, financial size, debt capacity |
| Non-financial | Management quality, governance structure, industry characteristics, country risk, credit rating |
| Extraordinary | Court actions and other one-off factors that could affect ability to honour commitments |
Stress testing and segmentation syllabus 4.3.6
| Tool | Key points |
|---|---|
| Stress testing | Identify possible events or changes in economic conditions that could hurt credit exposures and assess the bank's ability to withstand them. Areas the BIS says banks could "usefully examine": economic or industry downturns, interest rate and other market movements, market-risk events, liquidity conditions. Ranges from simple changes to one or more inputs to sophisticated models (typically large, internationally active banks). Review outputs periodically and act when results exceed tolerances, feed them into policies and limits, and use them for action plans such as hedging or reducing exposure |
| Segmentation | Under Basel, retail banking attracts less capital than commercial banking, and banks give regulators PD, LGD and EAD statistics for clearly differentiated portfolio segments. Segmentation is based on (i) credit scores (or equivalent) and (ii) time the transaction has been on the books |
External vs internal ratings syllabus 4.3.6
| Approach | Points |
|---|---|
| External ratings | Useful but of limited value to a sophisticated credit function: often too historic, agencies slow to react to adverse events, not detailed or sensitive enough versus the firm's own analysis |
| Internal ratings | The Basel Accord aims to incentivise banks to build their own systems. They differentiate the credit risk across exposures, and help judge portfolio characteristics, concentrations, problem credits and loan loss reserves. Larger banks also use them for internal capital allocation, pricing and profitability. They avoid split ratings (different agencies' ratings differing by several notches). Better systems have numerous gradations for satisfactory credits, and banks decide whether to rate the borrower, the transaction, or both. Ratings must be reviewed periodically and re-rated as conditions change, and set or confirmed by a credit review function independent of the one that originated the credit |
Impairment and key statistics / KPIs syllabus 4.3.6
Evidence of impairment:
- significant financial difficulty of the borrower (e.g. shown by liquidity or cash flow projections)
- an actual breach of contract (e.g. late principal or interest payments)
- a high probability of bankruptcy or reorganisation (e.g. a downgrade by a rating agency)
- the lender granting a concession it would not otherwise consider, for economic or legal reasons related to the borrower's difficulties
Loans should be regularly reviewed for deterioration so impairment is identified in a timely way. A management dashboard should show key statistics and KPIs, such as the number of debtors past their due date, clients breaching covenants and credit downgrades.
4.9 Concentration (HHI) + credit VaR
▼Controlling concentration risk syllabus 4.3.7
Single-name concentration is monitored centrally with lending limits per counterparty, with two challenges: (1) knowing the relationships between counterparties so that differently named entities in one corporate group are not missed; (2) loans may be only half the picture, as the bank could also hold equities in the firm, have lent stock to it, be managing assets for it and so on. Country and industry over-concentration also needs limits on lending across specific countries and sectors. Measuring concentration is the first step to managing it.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) syllabus 4.3.7
By construction the HHI lies between zero and one, with one meaning full concentration in a single counterparty. Advantages: simple to compute, moderate data needs. Disadvantage: it ignores credit quality (an exposure to an AAA borrower is treated like one to a B-rated borrower).
- 1 Portfolio A shares: 50% and 50%, i.e. 0.5 and 0.5. Squares: 0.25 + 0.25 = 0.50 (50%).
- 2 Portfolio B shares: 2% and 98%, i.e. 0.02 and 0.98. Squares: 0.0004 + 0.9604 = 0.9608 (96.08%).
- 3 Same total size, very different concentration: B's HHI is close to one, meaning almost fully concentrated in one loan.
Credit VaR and confidence levels syllabus 4.3.8
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is used to model credit risk in the trading book, at bond and portfolio level (developed further in the market risk chapter). The workbook explains the idea with a beach hut: measure a variable (tide height) over time, rank the readings, and read off the level exceeded only x% of the time (with 100 readings, the fifth highest is exceeded 5% of the time). Plotting the distribution and using standard deviation lets you read values at other probabilities.
For a bond, a commonly measured variable is its value in one year's time, based on the probability of moving from one credit rating to another (credit migration probabilities, published by rating agencies with the standard deviation). For a portfolio the same approach is used but correlations between bonds must be included to reflect diversification benefit.
The probabilities are confidence levels, the percentage that a value will not be exceeded. Example: a credit VaR of $5 million over one year at the 95% confidence level means there is only a 5% chance of losing more than $5 million in that time frame.
4.10 Ch 4 cheat sheet
▼All the numbers + names
| Item | Answer |
|---|---|
| Credit risk | Loss from failure of a counterparty or issuer to meet obligations (obligor = party owing) |
| Counterparty vs issuer | Party to my transaction fails vs issuer of the security fails |
| Concentration | Single-name vs sectoral (industry, geographic) |
| Settlement vs pre-settlement | At exchange of cash and instrument vs default earlier while contract has positive value (e.g. swap) |
| Northern Rock / Barings | Systemic (deposit run) vs idiosyncratic (rogue trader 1995, no contagion) |
| Credit exposure | Current exposure + potential future exposure (PFE estimated e.g. with VaR) |
| Credit risk premium | Borrowing rate minus default-free rate |
| Grades | AAA-BBB investment; BB-D speculative |
| UK-recognised agencies | Fitch, Moody's, S&P, DBRS (Germany adds JCRA) |
| Ratings limits | Credit quality only; opinion; slow (Enron); conflicts of interest; structured products |
| Expected loss | PD × EAD × LGD |
| Recovery rate | 100% - LGD |
| Credit events | Bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership, missed payment; can be a downgrade |
| Wrong way risk | Exposure adversely correlated with counterparty credit quality (e.g. its own shares as collateral) |
| Non-performing | Usually 90 days late (before that, past due) |
| Credit limits | By borrower, counterparty, connected group, sector, region, product; binding, not driven by customers |
| Netting example | Default replacement costs £4m/£6m without vs £2m/£3m with |
| Collateral types | Unilateral · bilateral · netted; marked to market |
| CDS | Buyer pays fee; seller pays on credit event; buyer gets counterparty risk on seller |
| Securitisation | Originator → SPV/issuer → bonds; assets ring-fenced from originator's bankruptcy |
| CCP | Guarantor of all trades; more netting |
| Haircut example | $100m + 3% = $103m |
| Credit risk function | Does not own risk; independent of trading; daily exposure monitoring |
| Board review | Credit strategy and significant policies reviewed at least annually |
| Scoring inputs | Financial · non-financial · extraordinary |
| Segmentation | By credit score and time on books; retail attracts less capital than commercial |
| Internal ratings | Independent credit review; avoid split ratings |
| HHI | Sum of squared shares, 0 to 1; A = 0.50, B = 0.9608; ignores credit quality |
| Credit VaR | $5m at 95% over one year = 5% chance of losing more than $5m |