Chapter 5 · Risk

6 of 50 exam questions (~12%) · BIS and Basel · credit, market, operational · systemic vs systematic · risk reviews · SEC 17f-5/17f-7 · AAF 01/20, SSAE 18 · reconciliation
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Why this chapter matters. 6 of 50 exam questions (~12%). No calculations, just clean definitions and matching of cause to countermeasure. Trap zones: systematic vs systemic (systematic hits a whole market or segment and cannot be diversified away; systemic is collapse of the whole financial system, and the workbook says the two are often mixed up), the BIS's three risk categories (credit, market, operational), issuer vs counterparty vs settlement risk (all three sit under credit risk), what custodians do not normally indemnify (systemic shocks to CSDs, clearing houses or payment systems) and how AIFMD and UCITS V change that for fund depositaries, SEC 17f-5 (custodians, 1984/1997) vs 17f-7 (depositories, 2001), AAF 01/20 (UK) vs SSAE 18 / ISAE 3402 (US / international) and the Type 1 vs Type 2 difference. This chapter also reuses ideas from Ch 2 (buy-ins, CCPs, ASDA/CSDA) and Ch 3 (reconciliation, corporate actions).

5.1 What is risk? BIS and Basel

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Risk and the BIS categories LO 5.1.1

Risk is both a source of profit (many investment banks earn heavily from managing market risk through proprietary trading) and a source of potential major loss. The workbook's examples of loss events: the bankruptcy of a major counterparty (Lehman Brothers filing for Chapter 11 in September 2008), collapse of a subcustodian or CSD, missing a large corporate action, a terrorist attack, and unauthorised trading (Barings Bank, Singapore, 1995). Financially, risk is the quantifiable likelihood of loss or underperformance of invested assets.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a Basel-based organisation that acts as a bank for central banks and a forum for monetary and financial cooperation, identifies three main risk categories:

CategoryDefinition
Credit riskLoss caused by a counterparty failing to settle its obligations
Market riskLoss of earnings or capital from movements in market prices (interest rates, exchange rates, equity values)
Operational riskLoss from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events
Memory hook: C-M-O = credit, market, operational. Everything else (political, systemic, liquidity, regulatory) sits outside this core trio in the workbook.

Basel Committee and the capital accords LO 5.1.1

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten at the end of 1974. It has 45 members from 28 jurisdictions, meets four times a year and has about 25 technical working groups. It sets broad supervisory standards and best-practice guidelines that national authorities refine, encouraging convergence without enforcing harmonisation.

StepKey facts
Basel Capital Accord (1988)Firms set aside a percentage of capital against the risks they face: greater exposure, higher capital charge. Its main focus was credit risk. Market-risk treatment followed in a policy document of April 1993
New Capital Adequacy Framework (proposed June 1999)Three pillars: (1) minimum capital requirements more sensitive to actual risks and controls; (2) supervisory review of internal assessment and capital adequacy; (3) market discipline through disclosure/transparency
Basel IIApproved 26 June 2004. In the EU it came into effect on 1 January 2007 via the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD); lenders covered by the CRD had to implement it from the start of 2008
Basel IIIPost-crisis reforms implemented by members 2013 to 2019; banks must hold minimum capital against risk-weighted assets (asset value multiplied by a scaling factor reflecting its risk)
Quick check
Which is the third pillar of the Basel II framework?

5.2 Credit, market and operational risk

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Credit risk: issuer, counterparty, settlement LO 5.1.1

Credit risk is the potential that a counterparty fails to meet its obligations on agreed terms. Management aims to maximise risk-adjusted return within acceptable limits, across the whole portfolio and each transaction. Loans are the biggest source for most banks, but it also arises in the banking and trading books, on and off balance sheet, in trade finance, FX, futures and options, and in settling transactions. Three elements to distinguish:

ElementDefinitionExample
Issuer riskThe issuer of a security defaults on its obligationsA bond issuer fails to pay interest or redeem principal at maturity
Counterparty riskAn institution defaults on obligations to a trade counterparty before settlementThe other side of a trade goes bankrupt before the trade settles
Settlement riskCompletion of the transaction does not happen as expected: a payment or asset is not made on time, or at all. Most likely with a non-simultaneous exchange of valueFOP settlement; FX legs paid at different times (Herstatt)

Market risk in securities operations LO 5.1.1

Market risk is the risk of loss of earnings or capital from changes in the value of financial instruments. Proprietary trading growth raised regulators' focus on it. Basel's 1993 policy paper proposed capital against price risk in interest rates, equities and currencies. In operations it appears when:

  • a custodian misses a corporate action (eg a rights issue) and must compensate the investor, and prices move against it before the exposure is closed;
  • an unmatched confirmation reveals both parties reported a sale, so one must reverse the transaction in the market at a changed price;
  • late or failed transactions or a missed rights issue occur in illiquid markets where extra stock is hard to borrow or buy.

Operational risk and its subcategories LO 5.1.1

The BCBS defines operational risk (OR) as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events". Contributing factors:

  • Internal and external fraud, theft
  • Total or partial interruption of systems or processes
  • Unauthorised access to computer systems or physical records, including cyber-attacks
  • Weak business continuity planning (fire, earthquake, terrorist attack)
  • Incorrect execution of processes, eg a transaction done in the wrong direction
  • Poor management supervision or delegation of authority; problems in staff employment contracts

OR has a day-to-day cost, and there is also the catastrophic risk that a single event causes an unrecoverable loss (firms have been forced into liquidation by fraud, environmental disasters or legal action).

SubcategoryMeaning
Transaction-processing riskAn error in processing a transaction causes a direct or indirect loss
Legal riskA contract is unenforceable, resulting in loss
Reputational riskAn act by the firm or an employee damages its reputation, causing loss; often results from an operational risk being realised
Worked example — classify the scenario
Identify the main risk type in each: (a) a custodian misses a rights issue and the share price then moves against it while it fixes the error; (b) a bond issuer fails to pay a coupon; (c) both parties to a trade report a sale; (d) a fund's shares cannot be sold without pushing the price sharply lower; (e) a new law makes an existing contract unenforceable.
  1. 1 (a) The cause is a process failure (operational), but the loss grows through price moves: the workbook uses this to show market risk in operations.
  2. 2 (b) Issuer risk (a form of credit risk).
  3. 3 (c) An unmatched-confirmation error that must be reversed in the market: again market risk arising from an operational mistake.
  4. 4 (d) Liquidity risk: cannot trade quickly without moving the price.
  5. 5 (e) A change in regime or policy that voids contracts is political risk under the workbook's definition; the enforceability of a contract as such is legal risk (an operational subcategory). Read the exam stem for the cause: policy change = political, defective contract = legal.

5.3 Other risks: political, systematic, systemic, liquidity, regulatory

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Political risk LO 5.1.1

The risk of loss triggered by a change in political regime or policy: changed regulation, contracts amended or rendered void, changes in economic strategy, tax policy or legal protection of property (eg expropriation), currency convertibility and freedom to repatriate profits, and geopolitical vulnerability (war, political takeover, civil unrest).

Systematic vs systemic risk LO 5.1.1

Systematic riskSystemic risk
MeaningVulnerability to events that affect the entire market or a whole segment of itRisk of collapse of the entire financial system or market, as opposed to risk tied to one entity or component
CharacteristicsVery unpredictable, nearly impossible to avoid; hard to mitigate by diversifying or hedging. Bonds can sometimes partly offset it in a bond-and-equity mix (rate rises hurt bonds and can help equities). Underlies virtually all investmentFailure of one entity or cluster can cascade through interdependencies (the 2007-08 asset-backed finance crisis). Highly dependent on the correlation of losses: in panic, asset correlations approach unity. Insurance is hard to obtain, since there may be no solvent counterparties
ExamplesInterest rate change, oil shortage, recession, inflation, war, natural disastersContagion in credit markets and banking
Trap: the workbook notes systemic is "sometimes erroneously referred to as systematic". A stem about "the whole financial system collapsing" = systemic. A stem about "affects the whole market, cannot be diversified away" = systematic.
Quick check
Which description fits systematic risk?

Liquidity, regulatory change and regulatory risk LO 5.1.1

  • Liquidity risk: how easily a security or asset (including investment funds) can be traded quickly, especially to raise cash, and whether it can be sold without moving the price. For funds it means meeting redemption orders as requested. Authorised and less complex funds generally carry less of it. A lack of liquidity depth risks a significant price move on a sale.
  • Regulatory change: a relentless flow of reform, much of it EU Directives and Regulations, that firms must keep pace with.
  • Regulatory risk: rising compliance cost and the need to show full compliance at all times. Public fines and sanctions for non-compliance, poor or incomplete data reporting and market abuse are a financial and, often worse, a reputational risk.

5.4 Risk reviews of infrastructure and subcustodians

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Network management: the first line of defence LO 5.1.2

A global custodian's network management group is the first line of risk management for cross-border settlement and overseas custody. With the legal department it holds primary responsibility for risk assessment of: (1) market infrastructure that may process or hold client assets, (2) the subcustodians it uses, and (3) other service providers to which it outsources custody-related functions. Standard practice: no client assets are held in an overseas market until a thorough review of clearing and settlement infrastructure, the local CSD and the national payments system has been done.

Subcustodian review factorQuestion asked
Credit rating and balance sheetEnough credit comfort? Are client assets protected if the agent or a depository/registrar holding them for it becomes insolvent?
Contingency planningBusiness continuity against natural hazards, political instability, terrorism
Track record and commitmentLong-term commitment; provisions to migrate assets to another agent
TechnologyPlatforms robust enough for daily volumes and peaks; commitment to upgrades
Communication and reportingGlobal standards (eg SWIFT ISO 15022 or 20022)
Market information and data flowsTimely notification of developments; multiple reliable sources for corporate actions and a cleansed, consolidated notice
Staff expertise and successionExperience, and cover if key staff leave; depth of local talent
Transparency and integrityHistory of misconduct or negligence; effective legal recourse for loss

These apply to agents in all markets but matter most in low-volume, emerging markets.

Indemnities, AIFMD and UCITS V LO 5.1.2

  • Global custodians typically insulate clients from fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct in their own organisation or by their agents (eg subcustodians).
  • Traditionally they do not indemnify clients against losses from systemic shocks to infrastructure (a CSD, clearing house or payments system): this is treated as market risk borne by the investor. They will make reasonable efforts to keep clients informed of the risks of a market. Nothing prevents a custodian offering such an indemnity, but it must weigh new business against the extra risk.
  • AIFMD and UCITS V raise the obligations of the global custodian when it acts as fund depositary: if a subcustodian, infrastructure entity (eg a CSD) or outsourced provider fails, it may have to provide full and immediate restitution of assets that were lost or frozen in insolvency. Custodians are therefore re-evaluating safekeeping risk and strengthening due diligence and monitoring of providers.
Trap: two opposite rules. Default position = no indemnity for systemic infrastructure shocks. Fund depositaries under AIFMD/UCITS V = may owe prompt restitution of lost or frozen fund assets.
Quick check
Traditionally, global custodians do NOT indemnify clients against losses from which of these?

5.5 SEC Rules 17f-5 and 17f-7

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17f-5 (foreign custodians) vs 17f-7 (foreign depositories) LO 5.1.2

SEC Rule 17f-5SEC Rule 17f-7
Introduced1984, extensively revised 19972001
Applies toA US investment company holding assets overseas with a custodian (must be an eligible foreign custodian, after rigorous due diligence)Any depository used by a US investment company (or its custodian) to hold assets: must be an eligible foreign depository
Must consider / satisfy(1) Access to books and records for auditors/accountants; (2) recovery of assets if the custodian is liquidated or assets are lost; (3) currency convertibility and repatriation; (4) expropriation: probability assets are confiscated, frozen or nationalisedA national or transnational securities centre regulated by a foreign financial regulator; subject to periodic audits (regulator or independent accountants); regular, comprehensive reports to all participants; equal safekeeping treatment of each participant; a register of assets held for each participant

The principles are widely used outside the US as the basis for risk reviews of infrastructures and custodian networks.

Memory hook: 17f-5 = custodians (four questions: books, recovery, currency, expropriation). 17f-7 = depositories (five criteria, 2001).

The AGC depository questionnaire LO 5.1.2

Many custodians collect similar information from the same depositories, so the Association of Global Custodians (AGC) centralised it: each depository submits one annual response to a comprehensive questionnaire of over 120 questions on its control environment and Rule 17f-7 data, a single consolidated risk report for all AGC member custodians. It covers:

AreaExamples
Structure and organisationLegal status and ownership; overseeing regulator; audit frequency
ParticipantsNumber and types; entry criteria
Method of holding assetsSegregation controls, recording, nominee arrangements, when finality of transfer is established
Settlement and asset servicingDvP, real-time or batch; income, corporate actions, tax, lending, collateral; links to other CSDs/ICSDs and protection against their collapse
Protection against lossesLocal-law protection from the depository's creditors; any lien on participants' accounts; delegation to third parties and limits of liability; liability for theft, fraud or force majeure; insurance and guarantee funds; business continuity
Record of lossesAny participant default causing a significant loss in the last three years

5.6 Global custody risks and countermeasures

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Matching cause to countermeasure LO 5.1.3

Global custody risks span the nature of the business, counterparties, credit, liquidity, market conditions, operational hazards, settlement, systemic and transfer risks. They are manageable with the right controls, but emerging markets (weak technology, market systems or regulation) need special care. Workbook settlement-risk table:

CauseCountermeasure
Late receipt of trade data or instructionsAgreed operating procedures; electronic link between manager and custodian
Cannot verify manager's instructionsTimely pre-matching (ideally via a clearing organisation or CSD); standard automated data flows; trade matching systems
Inaccurate or outdated pricing feedsCheck prices against several sources and vendors; regular (often daily) interaction with vendors
Acting on an unauthorised instructionAct only on valid signatures or authorised security procedures; keep up-to-date documentation of who may instruct
Transaction with a failing counterpartyUse a CCP that takes counterparty risk through novation; monitor the client's failed-trade history and send periodic analysis
DvP infrastructure unavailableSecure DvP on the books of a creditworthy settlement bank; use ASDA; if CSDA is used, collateralise positions so they can be reversed
Late delivery of securities or cashPrompt follow-up; compensation claim against the defaulting counterparty; initiate a buy-in
Parties not following market standardsIndustry associations promote standards (eg ISO messaging); possible price discounts for ISO-standard messages instead of fax or proprietary formats
Unreliable dividend and corporate action informationMultiple sources, including local press; subcustodians responsible for timely entitlement information
Delayed income collectionCredit dividends, interest and principal on due date only if timely payment is expected; contract should allow the credit to be reversed if funds do not arrive
Inaccurate or late client reportingImprove reporting systems; regularly reconcile predicted with actual positions
Client instructions not implemented, or implemented wronglyFour-eyes principle (a second person checks); forward-value instructions kept in a diary system reviewed daily
Trap: CSDA needs collateral so provisional credits can be reversed, while ASDA is the safer default. Cross-link: Ch 2, section 2.8.
Quick check
Which countermeasure best addresses client instructions being implemented incorrectly?

Operational and contractual (relationship) risks LO 5.1.3

Other operational risks: theft and fraud by personnel, loss of securities in transit, power cuts and system downtime, money laundering, hackers gaining access, and system faults such as a breakdown at the CSD.

Contractual relationships with investors, managers and subcustodians create their own risks:

  • A complete, unambiguous custody agreement must exist, and client documentation must be kept current for KYC.
  • Where an investment manager acts as principal, the custody contract is between the custodian and the manager.
  • Where a manager acts as agent, the custody relationship is with the beneficial owner. That owner must state which instructions may be accepted directly from its managers; credit limits for FX and overdrafts must be explicit; and the custodian should review regularly with managers and clients whether investment standards are met and instructions arrive on time.
  • Subcustodians: select on research and due diligence, review performance regularly including periodic site visits, and cover investors' demand for protection against subcustodian default in the custody contract.

5.7 Reporting on internal controls

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AAF 01/20 (UK) LO 5.1.4

Investors and regulators increasingly want reports on custodians' internal controls. Standard audit methodologies: AAF 01/20 in the UK; SSAE 18 and ISAE 3402 in the US and internationally (the workbook also mentions SSAE 16 as the earlier US label). AAF 01/20 is issued by the Audit and Assurance Faculty of the ICAEW and replaced AAF 01/06 in July 2020. The UK Pensions Act 1995 puts responsibility on pension fund management and trustees to review risk controls, and using an external custodian does not diminish their fiduciary responsibility.

The reporting accountants test the custodian (the service organisation) on physical controls and reconciliation, including that:

  • physical securities are released only on a customer-authorised, validated instruction;
  • all customers are contacted annually to verify the authorised signatory list;
  • six-monthly physical counts are done by staff not responsible for recording and authenticating transactions, with a six-monthly reconciliation to the books by independent people;
  • an independent securities compliance department reviews the counts and reconciliations, and management resolves anomalies promptly.

And on subcustodian network controls: arrangements are documented and reviewed by compliance; subcustodians confirm in writing that customer assets are in segregated accounts; and monthly reconciliations of subcustodian holdings to the custodian's records are reviewed by management.

The report describes the services, governance and infrastructure, and control objectives and activities with an enhanced management statement (with evidence). Benchmarks cover custody, fiduciary management, fund accounting, investment management and administration, pension administration, private equity, property investment management and administration, transfer agency and IT. AAF 01/20 added a description of key control activities (reconciliation, monitoring authorisations, independent reviews); the IT section changed most, with a focus on role profiles and access.

SSAE 18 and ISAE 3402: Type 1 vs Type 2 LO 5.1.4

SSAE 18 was developed by the AICPA (US) and ISAE 3402 by the IAASB of IFAC. Like AAF 01/20, they verify that an independent auditor has reviewed a service organisation's controls (generally including IT). They replace SAS 70.

ReportContent
Type 1Describes the service organisation's control procedures at a specific point in time
Type 2Also contains the organisation's description of controls and detailed testing of them over at least six months

SSAE 18 and ISAE 3402 keep the Type 1/2 distinction but add a requirement for a written assertion from management on the fairness of the description of controls, the suitability of their design and (for Type 2) their operating effectiveness. The workbook says it is unclear which will become more widely used. Why they matter: without a current report a custodian may face many audit requests and visits from customers' auditors; a report is evidence of effective controls that serves all users.

Memory hook: Type 1 = a snapshot (point in time). Type 2 = a film (tested over at least six months).
Quick check
What distinguishes a Type 2 service auditor's report from a Type 1 report?

5.8 Shareholder limits and foreign ownership

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Why limits exist and how they work LO 5.1.5

Ownership may be restricted in some companies or sectors. Markets may cap what any one non-resident can hold of a company, or the aggregate foreign share, and require disclosure by foreign investors (or their custodians) above set thresholds. Before investing, foreign investors may need documents proving nationality, investment licences and tax registration.

MarketExamples of restrictions (workbook)
AustraliaLimits in banking, civil aviation and airports, shipping, media, telecoms. Foreign holdings over 15% (individual) and 20% (aggregate) in a business with assets over AUD 50 million need prior approval (FIRB, Treasurer)
BrazilAggregate caps: air transport 20%, cable TV 49%, highway cargo 20%, media 30%. Some industries prohibited; prior authorisation for others; foreign stakes in financial institutions frozen at 5 October 1988 levels, additional purchases need central bank approval. Non-voting shares of financial institutions open since 1997
FranceAuthorisation in some sectors (defence, healthcare); non-EU stakes over 20% in certain listed companies need finance ministry approval
GermanyForeigners may own no more than 49.99% of Lufthansa registered shares; Federal Cartel Office approval for a dominant position; some federal bonds closed to foreign institutions
Hong KongNo single investor over 5% of HKEx without SFC approval; a single non-resident up to 10% of a TV broadcaster; aggregate foreign cap 49%; 2% of voting rights needs prior written approval from the Broadcasting Authority
JapanLimits on airlines, broadcasting, energy and telecoms (specific companies may be restricted)
South KoreaInvestment registration card (IRC) needed. IRC holders may own up to 100% of most companies. Exceptions: Korea Electric Power (aggregate 40%, individual 3%); petroleum, airlines and mining 50%; telecoms aggregate 49%; banks: large national city banks 4% individual, regional banks 15%
UKSome voting shares in industries of national importance have foreign ownership limits
USOverseas investors barred from direct investment in certain industries (communications, aviation, mining on federal land, energy, banking). Also, from January 2021, a ban on US investors investing in companies with ties to the Chinese military
You are unlikely to be asked all of these. Prioritise the concept (individual vs aggregate limits, IRC in Korea, documentation before investing) and a few distinctive numbers: Australia 15% / 20%, Korea IRC and 100% general rule, Lufthansa 49.99%.

5.9 Mitigating risk through reconciliation

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Open trade reconciliation LO 5.2.1

Reconciliation means proving that a firm's own records of balances, transactions and holdings agree with those of its custodian, prime broker or other outside provider. It is central to spotting fraud and handling errors early, and regulators require it regularly in many markets. A firm reconciles trade by trade: once a trade settles and confirmation arrives, internal records must show that (1) it is no longer an open trade, (2) the securities have been added to the custodian depot account inventory, and (3) the cash has been deducted from the nostro account.

The aim of open trade reconciliation is to prove that trades recorded as open are genuinely open at the custodian (and vice versa) and match the settlement instructions the custodian holds. Failure to do it can lead to:

  1. Contractual commitments to trading counterparties being misrepresented.
  2. Wasted operations resources (staff chasing trades that are not really open).
  3. Traders acting on wrong book positions, and possible penalties for selling stock the firm does not legally own where short selling is restricted.
  4. The stock lending desk lending stock it does not own, or borrowing to fill shortfalls that do not exist; repo desks relying on collateral that is not actually available.
  5. The credit risk department misjudging counterparty risk, tying up capital and liquidity unnecessarily.
  6. The cash account going overdrawn if a settled trade is not recorded, or a seller failing to make securities available.

Assets, entitlements and cash LO 5.2.1

Holdings and entitlements: reconciling internal records with custodian depot accounts detects (1) unauthorised removal of securities, (2) unexpected receipts (eg from a corporate action, or an unrecorded FOP transfer) and (3) errors updating ownership after settlement. It supports income processing (correct client credited; non-delivery investigated), because entitlement depends on who was the legal owner on the record date, and supports corporate actions (timely entitlements; voluntary instructions to the registrar before the deadline). Missing a deadline risks huge losses. UK cross-reference from Ch 3: reconcile records of assets not physically held at least every 25 business days, with custodian statements (or statements from the body holding the record of legal entitlement for CSD-held assets). Take particular care over assets held overseas with a subcustodian or local CSD.

Cash: the same process for custodian nostro accounts, by account and currency, ensures internal cash balances agree with each custodian. It prevents unanticipated debits from overdrawing accounts (penalty charges), stops unexpected receipts (including corporate action cash) sitting in non-interest-bearing accounts, supports accurate profit and loss for accounting, and gives credit risk the cash and collateral positions it needs to compute exposure.

Quick check
A failure to reconcile open trades could lead a firm to:

5.10 Ch 5 cheat sheet

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All the numbers + names

ItemAnswer
BIS three risk categoriesCredit · market · operational
BISBasel-based bank for central banks
Basel CommitteeSet up end-1974 by G10 central bank governors; 45 members, 28 jurisdictions; standards, not enforced harmonisation
Basel dates1988 accord · 1993 market risk paper · 1999 proposal · Basel II 26 Jun 2004 (EU 1 Jan 2007 via CRD) · Basel III 2013-2019
Basel II pillarsMinimum capital · supervisory review · market discipline (disclosure)
Credit risk elementsIssuer · counterparty · settlement
Settlement riskMost likely with a non-simultaneous exchange
Operational risk subcategoriesTransaction-processing · legal · reputational
Systematic vs systemicWhole market or segment, can't diversify / whole financial system collapse
Liquidity riskTrade quickly without moving the price; funds: meet redemptions
Network management groupFirst line of risk management
No indemnity (traditional)Systemic shocks to CSD, clearing house, payments system
AIFMD / UCITS VDepositary may owe full, immediate restitution of lost or frozen fund assets
SEC 17f-51984 (rev. 1997) · foreign custodian: books and records, recovery, currency, expropriation
SEC 17f-72001 · eligible foreign depository (regulated, audited, reports, equal treatment, register)
AGC questionnaire120+ questions · one annual response per depository
CountermeasuresCCP (failing counterparty) · four-eyes + diary (instructions) · ASDA or collateralised CSDA (DvP unavailable)
AAF 01/20ICAEW · replaced AAF 01/06 in July 2020 · six-monthly counts · annual signatory check
SSAE 18 / ISAE 3402AICPA / IAASB · replaced SAS 70 · Type 1 point-in-time · Type 2 tested 6+ months · management assertion
Ownership limitsAustralia 15% / 20% · Korea IRC · Lufthansa 49.99% · HK HKEx 5%
ReconciliationOpen trades · depot holdings · nostro cash · entitlements
That completes the five chapters. Revisit Ch 3 (heaviest) or jump to the cram sheet.