2.1 The BIS, the Basel Committee and why banks hold capital
▼The Bank for International Settlements syllabus 2.1.1
- A bank for central banks that fosters international monetary and financial cooperation. Its customers are central banks and international organisations. It does not accept deposits from, or serve, private individuals or corporate entities.
- Established in 1930; described as the world's oldest international regulatory organisation and the "regulators' regulator", a focal point for research and cooperation in international banking regulation. Headquarters: Basel, Switzerland.
- Its guidelines have no force in national or international law. Countries that choose to implement them do so by changing their own legal and regulatory processes.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) syllabus 2.1.2
The BCBS exists to enhance understanding of supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. It is the primary global standard-setter for prudential regulation of banks and a forum for cooperation, with a mandate to strengthen regulation, supervision and practices of banks to enhance financial stability.
It sets standards on capital adequacy so that banks hold enough reserves to withstand specific levels of risk. A global standard gives a level playing field and prevents regulatory arbitrage between nations, since the capital a bank must hold affects how much credit it can extend and its profitability. It also sets core principles for national regulators. It works by setting minimum standards, sharing supervisory approaches to improve cross-border cooperation, and exchanging information to spot emerging risks. The workbook says all major economies other than China follow the Basel Accord.
Its focus is banks, but regulators in places such as the UK apply similar rules, in modified form, to non-banks like investment managers and securities firms.
Bank runs, contagion, moral hazard syllabus 2.1.2
Banking normally works because depositors withdraw only a fraction of deposits at any time, so deposits support a larger volume of loans. Traditionally the main bank risk was credit risk from illiquid loans funded by shorter-term deposits. In an emergency loans could only be sold at discounts, so mass panic withdrawals cannot be met: a run. Fear alone, even if ill-founded, can cause failure. The spread of the fear is contagion, leading to systemic risk that could bring down the whole banking industry.
| Step | What happened |
|---|---|
| 1. Problem | Runs after the 1929 Wall Street Crash |
| 2. Fix | Deposit insurance and central-bank lender-of-last-resort provisions |
| 3. New problem | Moral hazard: depositors no longer had an incentive to consider a bank's viability before depositing, so market discipline was lost |
| 4. Further response | Require banks to hold a minimum level of capital, so they cannot lend out every last penny and can still repay depositors if some loans default |
Economic vs regulatory capital syllabus 2.1.2
| Type | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Economic capital | The bank's own best estimate of the capital it needs to manage its own risk profile |
| Regulatory capital | The mandatory level a regulator requires the bank to hold |
Both need comprehensive measurement systems. Without standard approaches it is very hard for regulators to compare levels across the global industry.
What the Accord covers, and Basel III/IV additions syllabus 2.1.2 - 2.1.3
The Basel Accord sets minimum capital ratios. The minimum set of risks covered is credit, market and operational: the assumption is that every financial firm faces these three, and more risk means more capital. Other risk types have capital requirements too but these tend to be firm-specific.
The enhancements known as Basel III (from 2023, called Basel IV in the workbook) went beyond capital ratios:
| Addition | What it does |
|---|---|
| Countercyclical capital buffer | Restricts banks' participation in system-wide credit booms, aiming to reduce their losses in credit busts |
| Leverage ratio | A minimum amount of loss-absorbing capital relative to ALL assets and off-balance-sheet exposures, regardless of risk weighting |
| Liquidity requirements/ratios | The workbook names two in Basel III: the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) |
Basel III also adds microprudential regulation overlaid with macroprudential capital buffers.
2.2 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
▼What the Core Principles are syllabus 2.1.3
The Core Principles define the minimum benchmark for judging the quality of supervisory systems. They let countries wishing to sign up to the Accord identify work needed to reach a baseline of sound supervisory practice. There are 29 principles (the workbook says they fall in seven groups and are the de facto global standard):
- Principles 1-13: supervisory powers, responsibilities and functions
- Principles 14-29: supervisory expectations of banks (prudential regulations and requirements), stressing good governance, risk management and compliance
The six national preconditions syllabus 2.1.3
- Sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies
- A well-established framework for financial stability policy formulation
- A well-developed public infrastructure: property and business laws, rules governing financial markets, well-regulated accounting, auditing and legal professions, efficient payment systems (to control counterparty risk), and an efficient, independent judiciary
- A clear framework for financial crisis management, recovery and resolution
- Mechanisms for an appropriate level of systemic protection or public safety net
- Effective market discipline
They are mostly outside supervisors' direct control but affect supervision in practice. The workbook's example: governments unwittingly breached the first by keeping interest rates unsustainably low in the early 2000s, encouraging lending, fuelling asset bubbles and, when they burst, the 2007-08 credit crunch and a global recession.
Principles 1-13: supervisory powers syllabus 2.1.3
| # | Topic | Gist |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Responsibilities, objectives, powers | Clear responsibilities for each authority and a legal framework giving powers to authorise banks, supervise, and take timely corrective action |
| 2 | Independence, accountability, resourcing, legal protection | Operational independence, transparent processes, adequate resources, accountability, legal protection for the supervisor |
| 3 | Cooperation and collaboration | Framework for working with domestic authorities and foreign supervisors, protecting confidential information |
| 4 | Permissible activities | Activities of licensed banks clearly defined; use of the word "bank" in names controlled |
| 5 | Licensing criteria | Power to set criteria and reject applications; assess ownership, governance (fitness and propriety), plans, controls, risk management, projected financials incl. capital; a foreign parent needs home supervisor consent |
| 6 | Transfer of significant ownership | Power to review, reject and impose conditions |
| 7 | Major acquisitions | Power to approve or reject major acquisitions or investments, incl. cross-border operations |
| 8 | Supervisory approach | Forward-looking risk-profile assessment proportionate to systemic importance; early intervention; plans for orderly resolution |
| 9 | Supervisory techniques and tools | A range of tools, resources deployed proportionately |
| 10 | Supervisory reporting | Collect and analyse prudential reports (solo and consolidated) and independently verify them |
| 11 | Corrective and sanctioning powers | Act early; adequate tools; able to revoke the banking licence or recommend revocation |
| 12 | Consolidated supervision | Supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis, worldwide |
| 13 | Home-host relationships | Home and host supervisors share information; foreign banks' local operations held to the same standards as domestic banks |
Principles 14-29: expectations of banks syllabus 2.1.3
| # | Topic | Gist |
|---|---|---|
| 14 | Corporate governance | Robust governance covering strategy, structure, control environment, board and senior management responsibilities and compensation |
| 15 | Risk management process | Comprehensive process (identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report, control or mitigate) incl. capital and liquidity adequacy and recovery plans where warranted |
| 16 | Capital adequacy | Prudent requirements reflecting risks; components defined by loss-absorbing ability; for internationally active banks not less than Basel standards |
| 17 | Credit risk | Adequate process covering the full credit lifecycle |
| 18 | Problem assets, provisions, reserves | Early identification and management of problem assets; adequate provisions and reserves |
| 19 | Concentration risk and large exposure limits | Prudential limits on exposure to single or connected counterparties |
| 20 | Transactions with related parties | Arm's length basis, monitored, risks controlled, exposures written off under standard policies |
| 21 | Country and transfer risks | Policies for these risks in international lending and investment |
| 22 | Market risks | Adequate process incl. risk of significant deterioration in market liquidity |
| 23 | Interest rate risk in the banking book | Adequate systems to identify, measure and control it |
| 24 | Liquidity risk | Prudent liquidity requirements and strategy; for internationally active banks not lower than Basel standards |
| 25 | Operational risk | Adequate operational risk management framework |
| 26 | Internal control and audit | Delegation of authority, separation of committing the bank / paying away funds / accounting for assets and liabilities, reconciliation, safeguarding assets, independent internal audit and compliance |
| 27 | Financial reporting and external audit | Reliable records; internationally accepted accounting; annual publication with an external auditor's opinion |
| 28 | Disclosure and transparency | Regular publication of financial condition, performance, risk exposures, risk strategies and governance |
| 29 | Abuse of financial services | Strict customer due diligence to prevent use of the bank for criminal activities |
2.3 The three Basel pillars
▼Pillars 1, 2 and 3 syllabus 2.2.1
The Accord aims to improve risk management through three mutually reinforcing pillars.
| Pillar | Name | What it involves |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Minimum regulatory capital requirements | Semi-formulaic (the workbook also says "formulaic") calculation of the minimum capital |
| 2 | Supervisory review process | Firm submits extra information so the regulator can judge the capital to hold: risks not covered by Pillar 1, how risk is managed, quality of the controls infrastructure, and how the risk profile relates to strategic and financial plans. The firm offers its own view of capital and liquidity, and the regulator sets the level it thinks appropriate |
| 3 | Market discipline | Public disclosure of prescribed aspects of the firm's capital and approach to risk management |
The workbook presents this as the "basic" bank requirement, using its own diagram; it does not go into risk weighting here, so treat the formula as the headline fact.
Sound practice principles syllabus 2.2.1
From time to time the Basel Committee publishes "sound practice" documents on aspects of risk management, such as operational risk, credit risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk. They give practical guidance to firms and highlight areas for regulators to address.
2.4 Internal capital and liquidity assessment
▼The Pillar 2 process: ICAAP and ICARA syllabus 2.2.1
Pillar 2 is known in Europe and certain other countries as the Internal Capital and Liquidity Assessment. Banks use the ICAAP (Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process); most investment management firms have a similar process, the ICARA (Internal Capital Adequacy and Risk Assessment). UK investment firms under the investment firms prudential regime (IFPR, the "New Regime") must perform it, as must banks in many jurisdictions. The firm must:
- assess its risks and their mitigants
- subject the results to rigorous stress testing
- determine an appropriate level of capital and liquidity for those risks
What the assessment document contains syllabus 2.2.1
| Section | Content |
|---|---|
| Risk exposure | Risk appetite by risk category and quantification of risks not in Pillar 1: e.g. credit/market/operational risk calculated differently from Pillar 1, liquidity, insurance, concentration, residual, securitisation, business (strategic), interest rate and pension obligation risk |
| Adequacy of risk management processes | Lets the firm justify holding less capital than the gross risks it faces: better risk and control framework means lower net risk, so less capital |
| Financial and capital plans | Current and projected financial and capital positions, strategic position, balance sheet strength, future profitability |
| Stress and scenario tests | See below, plus management actions in response, especially to an economic downturn |
| Capital and liquidity adequacy | Capital and dividend plan compared with the aggregated risk assessments; a quantitative technique to combine risks, with any correlations used for diversification benefit justified |
| Use test | Extent to which risk-based decision making is embedded in the firm |
| Setting the level | The regulator sets the capital (and/or liquidity) the firm must hold, based on the assessment and discussions with the firm |
Stress testing vs scenario analysis syllabus 2.2.1
| Technique | Method | Workbook example |
|---|---|---|
| Stress testing | Vary one input factor at a time | The effect of an increase in interest rates |
| Scenario analysis | Build realistic scenarios (combinations), perhaps from past extreme events, to question the current position | Apply the conditions of a previous prolonged market fall to the business plan and observe the effect on break-even |
Regulators expect risks and financial plans to be stressed individually, and realistic combinations tested as scenarios. A standard UK test is a prolonged economic downturn's effect on market levels. The results give an upper loss limit against which available capital is assessed.
The use test, incentives and benefits syllabus 2.2.1
The use test asks how far risk-based decision making is embedded in the firm. Evidence includes:
- senior management or board challenge, review and sign-off, including notes in board and risk committee minutes
- how far the assessment is part of capital and liquidity management, including use of capital modelling, scenario analysis and stress testing, e.g. in setting pricing and charges and the level and nature of future business
The process is meant to incentivise better risk management. Firms can hold less Pillar 1 capital via more sophisticated approaches to market, credit and operational risk, and regulators also expect Pillar 2 evidence of internal incentives for good risk behaviour, such as linking staff performance to good risk practice. Benefits: (1) business strategy: managers include risk factors earlier in new business design because new business can require extra capital or liquidity; (2) risk assessments are taken more seriously because the regulator may question managers personally. The challenge: it is an intense process needing lots of senior management time.
2.5 Home/host regulation + global implementation
▼The Basel Concordat on cross-border supervision syllabus 2.2.2
Because many banks operate in several countries, the Concordat gives a framework for multi-jurisdiction supervision, focusing on solvency, liquidity and foreign exchange positions. Home (parent) regulators must communicate closely with host regulators where the bank has branches, subsidiaries or joint ventures.
Main home/host principle: parent banks and parent supervisors should monitor the risk exposure of the banks or groups they are responsible for wherever the business is conducted. This does not lessen host authorities' responsibility for foreign establishments in their territories. Four principles govern supervision of foreign establishments:
- All international banks should be supervised by a home authority that capably performs consolidated supervision.
- Creating a cross-border establishment needs the prior consent of both the host and home authority.
- Home authorities should have the right to gather information from cross-border establishments.
- If the host authority finds any of these three not being met, it could impose restrictive measures or prohibit the establishment of banking offices.
Supervisors cannot be satisfied about a bank's soundness unless they can examine its business worldwide, and host authorities should tell home authorities immediately of any serious problem in a foreign establishment.
Differences in global implementation syllabus 2.2.2
- There is no international guidance on how best to adopt the global banking rules nationally.
- BCBS standards are designed for "internationally active banks", but national regulators have flexibility over the scope and apply them proportionately to their own banks.
- Many non-BCBS countries have adopted the standardised approaches for credit, market and operational risk. The internal models approaches are adopted by many countries, though the vast majority are European jurisdictions.
- The workbook's diagram shows BCBS-member jurisdictions applying the full Basel set to internationally active banks, while for non-internationally active banks the general approach varies across full, modified or alternative domestic standards.
2.6 Statutory vs principles-based regulation
▼Two approaches syllabus 2.3.1
| Approach | Idea | Workbook example |
|---|---|---|
| Statutory (rules-based) | Specific legal rules that must be obeyed | US Securities and Exchange Commission (regulating non-banking financial activity) |
| Principles-based | General statements of the behaviour expected of firms and individuals | UK regulatory authorities |
Neither is perfect. Supporters of principles-based regulation believe it is impossible to write a rule for every situation. Many compliance and legal practitioners are more comfortable with rules and, under a principles-based regime, tend to seek detailed guidance on how to interpret the principles.
National regulator responsibility and risk-based supervision syllabus 2.3.2
Supervision is the day-to-day regulatory relationship: monitoring firms for compliance. National regulators both set the rules or principles and monitor compliance. In the UK the FCA's duty stems from the Financial Services Act 2012, and its arrangements are shaped by three statutory objectives:
- protect consumers
- protect financial markets and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system
- promote effective competition in the interests of consumers
Powers include access to a firm's premises with or without notice during reasonable business hours, and the use of mystery shoppers (recording what a firm actually says to establish its normal practice, which is hard to know after the event).
Firms are supervised in line with the risk they present to the regulator's statutory objectives, assessed by impact (effect on consumers and the market) and probability (likelihood). The regulator's view of risk is not necessarily the firm's own. Example: in the 2006 credit boom banks borrowed short to lend long, all assuming they could borrow from other banks if needed, so when all had trouble there was not enough emergency liquidity in the system.
2.7 FCA principles, conduct, SMR + risk-based supervision
▼Consumer protection: FCA vs PRA, conduct risk syllabus 2.3.3
Financial products are conceptual and complex rather than physical, and last years or decades, so consumer protection is vital. In the UK the FCA is charged with protecting consumers, while the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) supervises firms from a capital perspective, including capital adequacy. The FCA uses conduct risk for the risk that a firm's behaviour or products lead to sub-optimal outcomes for consumers. Because firms know far more than customers (an asymmetric information relationship), they must be intentional about putting customers first, over-compensating if necessary.
The FCA's 11 Principles for Businesses syllabus 2.3.3
| Group | The firm must... |
|---|---|
| First five: indirect effect on customer outcomes | (1) conduct business with integrity; (2) with due skill, care and diligence; (3) take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems; (4) maintain adequate financial resources; (5) observe proper standards of market conduct |
| Next five: direct effect on customer outcomes | (6) pay due regard to customers' interests and treat them fairly; (7) pay due regard to information needs and communicate clearly, fairly and not misleadingly; (8) manage conflicts of interest fairly; (9) take reasonable care that advice and discretionary decisions are suitable; (10) arrange adequate protection for clients' assets |
| Last one: relationship with regulators | (11) deal with regulators in an open and cooperative way and disclose anything the regulator would reasonably expect notice of |
They are the highest-level outcomes the FCA seeks and are underpinned by more detailed rules. Since the FCA's first objective is consumer protection, even the last principle can be said to be about consumer protection.
Business standards, conduct risk and PPI syllabus 2.3.3
Conduct of business standards cover how business is done, especially how products are marketed, distributed, sold and managed. They include guidelines on communicating with clients, client asset guidance (including segregating client money from the firm's own), market conduct for wholesale and professional markets, and training and competence.
The workbook's conduct-risk example is Payment Protection Insurance (PPI): designed to cover loan repayments after job loss or illness, but often sold to customers already unemployed or ill, sometimes with the claim it improved the chance of loan approval, and in the worst cases added to the loan without the customer's knowledge. Regulators expect conduct risk to be considered at every stage of the product lifecycle: before, during and after design and launch.
Financial crime, the Senior Managers Regime, regulatory standards syllabus 2.3.3
| Area | Key points |
|---|---|
| Financial crime prevention | After money laundering cases, regulators issued legislation; the workbook cites the EU's package strengthening AML, anti-bribery and corruption and countering terrorism financing rules, taking account of new technology and digital currencies |
| Senior Managers Regime (SMR) | Targeted behavioural standards for individuals in key roles. Firms allocate and map management responsibilities and prepare Statements of Responsibilities for those carrying out Senior Management Functions (SMFs); they must assess fitness and propriety before applying for approval and periodically after. Conduct rules set a basic standard, and firms must make staff aware of them |
| Regulatory standards | Supervisory: information firms must supply, regulator's access rights, frequency of reviews and risk assessment visits. Disciplinary: fines for misconduct, forcing firms to compensate customers, requiring a third-party expert at the firm's expense, removing the licence |
Risk-based reviews and risk assessment visits syllabus 2.3.4
Regulators need to know the firms they supervise. The base level of supervisory intensity depends on the risk impact and probability scores given to a firm or group; these scores set the nature of the relationship. All firms get baseline monitoring: analysing returns and checking compliance, done remotely, through visits and interviews, or (in some jurisdictions) with permanent regulator desks in the firm.
| Firms | Assessed on |
|---|---|
| All authorised firms | Management, governance and culture; control functions; AML/CFT; capital and liquidity |
| Significant retail or wholesale businesses (in addition) | Customers; products; markets |
| Firms permitted to hold client money (in addition) | Safeguarding arrangements |
Where shortfalls are found, a risk mitigation programme is agreed and followed up with senior management and control functions. Failures can lead to fines and penalties for the firm and key persons, including bans from holding SMR roles.
2.8 Other legislation
▼Why firms must identify all relevant law syllabus 2.4.1
If the law is broken, knowingly or not, the firm can suffer:
- reputational damage
- withdrawal of regulatory authorisation for profitable activities
- fines and penalties
- criminal and civil liability
- loss of talented staff through dismissal or custodial sentence
Identifying all applicable legislation is especially important for new start-ups, firms launching new business lines and firms setting up overseas offices. The risk of inadvertent breach is mitigated by professional legal advice, formal communication with regulators and participation in national and international industry groups.
2.9 Ch 2 cheat sheet
▼All the numbers + names
| Item | Answer |
|---|---|
| BIS | Bank for central banks · est. 1930 · Basel · guidelines not law until implemented |
| BCBS | Primary standard-setter for bank prudential regulation · capital adequacy · level playing field · avoids regulatory arbitrage |
| Bank run fix and side-effect | Deposit insurance + lender of last resort → moral hazard → minimum capital |
| Economic vs regulatory capital | Own best estimate vs mandatory level |
| Accord risks | Credit, market, operational |
| Basel III/IV additions | Countercyclical buffer · leverage ratio (no risk weighting) · liquidity ratios (NSFR, LCR) |
| Core Principles | 29 · 1-13 supervisors · 14-29 banks · 6 preconditions |
| Pillar 1 | Minimum capital: capital > 8% × (credit + market + operational) |
| Pillar 2 | Supervisory review · ICAAP (banks) · ICARA (investment firms) |
| Pillar 3 | Market discipline · public disclosure |
| Stress test | One factor at a time |
| Scenario analysis | Realistic combinations, often past extreme events |
| Use test | Is risk-based decision making embedded (board sign-off, modelling in real use)? |
| Concordat principles | Consolidated home supervision · prior consent of home and host · home right to information · host may restrict or prohibit |
| Statutory vs principles | Specific rules (US SEC) vs general expected behaviours (UK) |
| FCA statutory objectives | Protect consumers · protect markets/integrity · promote competition |
| FCA vs PRA | Consumer protection/conduct vs capital-focused supervision |
| FCA Principles for Businesses | 11 = 5 indirect + 5 direct + 1 regulators |
| Supervision intensity | Impact and probability scores |
| Breaking the law: harms | Reputation · authorisation withdrawn · fines · criminal/civil liability · staff loss |