7.1 What liquidity means, and why it matters (Northern Rock)
▼Three uses of the word "liquidity" chapter summary
Every use of the term comes back to cash: having it, reaching it, or converting into it.
| Subject | Called liquid when... |
|---|---|
| Institution | It can easily meet its cash needs (cash in hand, or it can raise or borrow cash) |
| Market | Instruments can be bought or sold in quantity with little impact on prices |
| Asset | The market for that asset is liquid, so it converts easily to cash |
Liquidity risk (the workbook's definition) is the risk that a firm has insufficient cash to meet its cash obligations and either becomes insolvent or suffers losses from borrowing, selling assets below market price, or paying contractual penalties.
The chapter concentrates on banks because a shortfall at one bank can have system-wide effects, as 2008 showed. Securities firms are exposed too if assets are financed by short-term wholesale borrowing. Investment managers focus mainly on liquidity inside their clients' funds, including, in some cases, the ability to block redemptions.
Northern Rock case study chapter summary
The workbook uses Northern Rock as its example of how quickly a bank fails in a liquidity crisis:
- Market turmoil from mid-2007; the inter-bank wholesale markets froze on 9 August.
- Northern Rock's model funded long-term mortgage loans largely with short-term wholesale inter-bank borrowing, a maturity mismatch that made it especially vulnerable when funding dried up.
- The Tripartite Authorities (Bank of England, the regulator and the Treasury) discussed it on 14 August; support for the bank was contemplated.
- The announcement of government support raised the public's perception that the bank was in trouble; queues formed at branches and the bank was ultimately taken into national ownership.
What went wrong before 2008 chapter summary
After the crisis the Basel Committee published Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. The failings the workbook lists in the run-up to the crisis:
- No adequate framework pricing the liquidity risk of individual products and business lines, so business-level incentives were misaligned with the bank's overall risk tolerance.
- Liquidity for contingent obligations (contractual or not) was ignored as "highly unlikely".
- Severe, prolonged disruption was viewed as implausible, so stress tests did not consider market-wide strain, severity or duration.
- Contingency funding plans were not linked to stress test results and sometimes ignored the possible closure of funding sources.
7.2 Identifying liquidity risk: the maturity ladder
▼Liquidity risk cannot be isolated syllabus 7.1.1
A firm's liquidity depends on its immediate cash need, cash on hand, available credit lines and how easily non-cash assets convert to cash. Its reputation and credit rating matter too, because counterparties will not lend to a firm that looks troubled. Liquidity risk is intertwined with:
- Financial controls such as the cash flow statement, and instruments that generate cash or need cash for margin calls.
- Credit risk: default on a loan or bond, or failure of a guarantor or derivative counterparty.
- Market risk: inability to trade or get a price when needed, from lack of supply or demand or a shortage of market makers.
- Operational risk: for example a major outsource supplier fails and its replacement needs immediate cash.
- Business risk: a change that makes the strategy obsolete, such as withdrawal of favourable tax treatment for a product.
Like operational risk it is hard to quantify and pervasive, but with a key difference: an operational problem can sit undetected for a while, whereas the effects of a liquidity squeeze are measured in days, and even intra-day problems can cause serious disruption. Ultimately impaired liquidity leads to insolvency and can cause tighter conditions across markets, which is systemic risk.
The maturity ladder syllabus 7.1.1
A maturity ladder compares cash inflows and outflows day by day and across chosen time periods, and calculates the cumulative net excess or deficit of funds at each date. Building one means:
- Inflows are ranked by the date assets mature, or a conservative estimate of when credit lines can be drawn.
- Outflows are ranked by the date liabilities fall due, the earliest date a holder could exercise an early-repayment option, or the earliest date contingencies could be called.
- Readily marketable assets are "slotted in" at the earliest point they could be sold, with a discount for market risk.
- Significant interest flows, clearing-service flows for correspondent banks, overheads (rent, salaries) and future strategic commitments are also included.
A ladder never gives the complete picture, for example because derivative cash flows have a very broad range of outcomes.
- 1 Total inflows = 100 + 20 + 50 + 10 = 180.
- 2 Total outflows = 50 + 10 + 30 + 10 = 100.
- 3 Excess = 180 − 100 = 80. Excess or shortfall each period is the starting point for the bank's future liquidity position. (The workbook's later periods: day two +5, days 3 to 15 +20, days 16 to 30 +20.)
Why actual receipts differ from contractual syllabus 7.1.1
Three reasons the ladder's contractual flows will not match what actually arrives:
| Reason | Detail |
|---|---|
| 1. Uncertain instruments | Some instruments (derivatives) have a very broad range of outcomes; statistical modelling gives ranges of likely cash flows. |
| 2. Credit risk | The counterparty may pay late or not at all, so the figure must be risk-weighted (techniques from Chapter 4). |
| 3. Business choice | The firm may not hold the instrument to maturity, so actual flows differ even with no credit issue. |
7.3 Asset vs funding liquidity, and the impact of failure
▼Asset liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk syllabus 7.1.1
| Asset liquidity risk | Funding (liability) liquidity risk | |
|---|---|---|
| Side of balance sheet | Assets | Liabilities |
| Source of cash | Maturing or sold assets, or assets used as collateral in secured funding (repo) | Unsecured funding from depositors, third parties and wholesale markets |
| The risk is | Unable to turn assets into cash in the preferred time without loss | Funding is not available when required |
| Linked to | Market risk (ease of sale) and credit risk (ease of using as collateral) | Perceived credit risk of the bank when it seeks emergency funding |
Impact on the firm and the system syllabus 7.1.2
Within the firm: it cannot meet obligations as they fall due, and suffers loss from the cost of borrowing to cover them or from contractual penalties. Ultimately illiquidity results in insolvency.
Across the system: banks are special because they bridge short-term cash needs and longer-term cash flows, in effect borrowing short to lend long. When trouble is heard of, depositors withdraw, forcing the bank to sell assets (perhaps at a loss) or raise dearer finance, which is a negative self-reinforcing process that, without intervention, ends in failure. Failure spreads contagion: confidence falls in the system as a whole and queues form at other banks.
7.4 Measuring funding liquidity: gap analysis and stress testing
▼Cash matching and liquidity gap analysis syllabus 7.2.1
Negative net future cash flows over a period are a major source of liquidity risk. Cash matching examines all net future cash flows: a firm or portfolio is cash matched if every future inflow is balanced by an offsetting outflow on the same date, and vice versa. Gap analysis then groups cash flows into maturity brackets and checks whether each bracket nets to zero. A liquidity gap is the net cash flow of a bracket.
| Bracket (months) | 0-3 | 3-6 | 6-12 | 12-24 | 24-36 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inflows (£m) | 130 | 165 | 90 | 60 | 50 |
| Outflows (£m) | 130 | 25 | 90 | 70 | 50 |
| Gap | 0 | +140 | 0 | −10 | 0 |
So there is a positive gap of £140m in months 3 to 6 and a negative gap of £10m in months 12 to 24. The bank can then arrange to correct future gaps where necessary.
Shortcomings: it ignores credit risk (assumes all flows occur) and cannot handle options meaningfully, because option cash flows are highly uncertain in size and sometimes timing, so cannot be placed in a definite bracket.
- 1 Gap = inflows − outflows. First bracket: 90 − 70 = +20.
- 2 Second bracket: 60 − 70 = −10.
- 3 The negative gap (−10) is the liquidity risk the bank must arrange to fund. The surplus in the other bracket does not automatically cover it, because it falls at a different time.
Stress testing and expected funding needs syllabus 7.2.1
Stress testing assesses how outcomes change when individual inputs are stressed. Steps in the workbook's sequence:
- Collect contractual liquidity data across all businesses (for example via gap analysis).
- Set out normal-behaviour assumptions, clearly documented and often based on history (what customers have done before).
- Tailor those assumptions to the area being stressed. Some stress inputs come from history (for example collateral value volatility); others are necessarily subjective.
- Treat the normal assumptions as the base case and record every movement away from them together with the reasoning.
Expected future funding requirement. To estimate normal future funding needs banks use: historical patterns of roll-overs, draw-downs and new loan requests; statistical analysis allowing for seasonal and other effects; subjective high-level business projections; and a customer-by-customer assessment of large customers with historical relationships applied to the rest.
7.5 Measuring asset liquidity: the four measures
▼Bid-offer spread, depth, immediacy, resilience syllabus 7.2.2
| Measure | Question it answers | Use and limitation |
|---|---|---|
| Bid-offer spread | How much does an immediate sale then purchase cost? (Difference between market makers' bid and offer) | Ratio of spread to mid-price compares assets: smaller ratio = more liquid. Limitation: the spread reflects transaction cost as well as liquidity. |
| Market depth | What volume is needed to move the price? | Deeper = higher volume needed. A shallow market means quick sales push the price down, forcing more sales. Spectrum: very deep for blue-chip equities (FTSE 100, Dow Jones) to very shallow for specific commercial or industrial property and private equity. Limitation: depth can change very rapidly. |
| Immediacy | How long does it take to complete a deal? | Depends on market makers. Not simply about price: in 2008 inter-bank rates rose well above base rates yet banks still would not lend, fearing they would not get their money back. |
| Resilience | How fast do prices return to equilibrium after a large trade? | The more liquid the market, the faster prices recover. |
7.6 Managing liquidity risk: process, ILAA, limits
▼The fourfold management process syllabus 7.3.1
Too little liquidity threatens survival; too much hurts profits, so management is a balancing act. The process:
- Determine the contractual liquidity position.
- Overlay assumptions about normal behaviour.
- Stress test by reviewing how normal assumptions change under stress scenarios.
- Using the results, assess current liquidity provision, establish the cost of contingency arrangements, and compare the risk levels to risk appetite and profitability goals.
Techniques used to stay within appetite: liquidity limits, counterparty credit limits, scenario analysis, liquidity at risk, diversification and behavioural analysis.
UK regulatory reporting: the ILAA syllabus 7.3.1
In the UK, banks and certain other firms must submit their approach to liquidity risk under the Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA). Firms in the regime provide their regulator with, among other things: a full review of their liquidity position and access to liquidity, the composition of liquid assets, contractual and behavioural deposit assumptions, secured and unsecured funding profiles under normal and prescribed stress conditions; a review of liquidity risk governance; a statement of liquidity risk appetite; stress testing policies, processes and methodologies and scenario assumptions; contingency funding plans; management information; and a justification of the firm's assessed liquidity requirement.
It is different for investment managers syllabus 7.3.1
An investment manager's cash flow needs are more predictable than a bank's, and fund liquidity is managed differently: a fund must remain as liquid as its prospectus or mandate says. (A prospectus refers to a specific investment such as a collective scheme, not a discretionary portfolio.) Assets differ: cash is the most liquid and property the least, so managers balance cash, equity, bonds and property considering the liquidity premium each needs to be converted to cash.
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
| Gate | Limits the level of redemptions under set circumstances, temporarily spreading redemptions when it is hard to sell quickly at a good price |
| Side pocket | Assets designated illiquid are placed in a segregated account of the fund from which no redemptions are permitted |
Liquidity limits and counterparty credit limits syllabus 7.3.1
Liquidity limits put a ceiling on the projected net funding requirement along the maturity ladder, with escalation procedures for each breach. A common form limits cumulative contractual mismatches (for example net funding requirement as a percentage of total liabilities) over several horizons, and may include estimated outflows from commitment drawdowns. Funding concentration limits cap reliance on wholesale or retail funding. The aim: even under stress, available liquidity exceeds liquidity needs.
For a global bank, limits may vary by time zone: less severe at the start of the global day (Asia-Pacific hours) when there is time to mobilise funds, tightening as currency zones close, strictest late in the day when only US markets are open. Limits should suit the firm's size, complexity and condition, be reviewed against stress scenarios, and have specific approval procedures for exceptions.
Counterparty credit limits. Liquidity problems also arise when counterparties cannot settle, through their own financial trouble, inter-bank payment failures or data mismanagement. So the bank maintains intra-day counterparty credit limits in addition to the credit limits of Chapter 4.
7.7 Scenarios, liquidity at risk, diversification and funding
▼The three benchmark scenarios syllabus 7.3.1
Drivers of liquidity risk include market concerns over credit availability, general market and economic conditions, and global shocks. Three scenarios give benchmarks:
| Scenario | Assumption | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Going concern | Normal behaviour of balance-sheet cash flows; many loans roll over, many deposits stay or are replaced | Benchmark for managing use of deposit and debt markets; avoids huge needs on any one day |
| 2. Bank-specific crisis | Crisis confined to one bank; many liabilities cannot be rolled over or replaced and must be repaid at maturity, so the bank winds down its books somewhat | One worst-case benchmark. If the bank survives this, it can almost certainly survive milder firm-specific problems. Honouring deposits buys time to fix the underlying problem. |
| 3. General market crisis | Liquidity affected at all banks in one or more markets; severe tiering by perceived credit quality; ability to sell less liquid assets falls sharply | A second worst-case benchmark. Supervisors use it to gauge the size of the total banking-system liquidity buffer. A highly reputed bank may benefit from a flight to quality. |
For each funding source the bank decides whether the liability will be repaid in full at maturity, run off gradually over the next few weeks, or be virtually certain to roll over or remain available. Because uncertainty is unavoidable, banks err on the side of caution: later dates for cash inflows, earlier dates for cash outflows.
- 1 Normal: 180 − 100 = +80.
- 2 Institution-specific crisis: 180 − 220 = (40). Deposit runoffs jump from 30 to 100 and lending-commitment drawdowns from 10 to 60, though asset sales still bring in 60.
- 3 General market crisis: 105 − 195 = (90). Here asset sales fall to 0 because few buyers exist, so it is the worst day-one position even though runoffs are lower than in the bank-specific case.
Lessons from the crisis scenarios syllabus 7.3.1
Looking at liabilities in the two crisis scenarios, a bank asks four basic questions:
- Which funding sources stay under any circumstance and can be increased? (Core retail and small-business deposits often stay because of the public-sector safety net or high switching costs.)
- Which run off gradually, and at what rate? Can deposit pricing control the rate?
- Which run off immediately at the first sign of trouble? Are early-withdrawal options likely to be exercised?
- Does it have back-up facilities to draw down?
Non-banks such as securities firms also gain from scenarios: firms with contingent commitments should forecast contingent liability needs, including early termination and collateral provisions in derivative contracts.
Liquidity at risk (LaR) syllabus 7.3.1
Like VaR in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the same idea estimates likely funding shortfalls. Because a maturity ladder cannot predict uncertain cash flows, the alternative is to use historic data: define brackets of funding amounts, count how many times actual net funding over the chosen interval fell in each bracket (for example, $20m to $16m counted 14 times and $16m to $12m counted 18 times), and arrange the counts as a distribution with common amounts in the middle and rarer amounts in the tails. As with market and credit VaR, the LaR distribution shows the likely funding requirement over a period at different confidence levels.
Diversification and behavioural analysis syllabus 7.3.1
Diversify liquidity resources by: type of liquidity instrument, currency of funding, counterparties, liability term structure, and the availability of markets to realise liquid assets. In stress, diversification can be undermined by: funding withdrawn after a rating downgrade; disputes over binding lending commitments; market closure or reduced capacity; reliance on a few brokers; and positive correlations between funding sources and liquid assets.
Behavioural analysis studies how liabilities behave in normal conditions: normal rollover levels, the effective maturity of deposits without contractual maturity (demand deposits, certain savings accounts) and normal growth of new accounts. Instant-access withdrawals are hard to predict, so banks use statistical analysis of seasonality, interest-rate sensitivity and macro factors, plus customer-by-customer rollover assessments for large wholesale depositors.
Funding methods syllabus 7.3.1
Liquidity is available from both sides of the balance sheet, and concentration in any one type should be avoided.
| Side | Sources |
|---|---|
| Liabilities | Wholesale money markets, securitisation of loan portfolios, retail deposits, loan facilities with the central bank |
| Assets | Less liquid assets used as collateral via repos and securities lending or posted to support trading strategies; loan repayments |
Each source differs in cost, availability, maturity and its own liquidity risk, so good management uses both sides while weighing the risks and costs.
7.8 Netting and market dislocation
▼Cash netting agreement calculation syllabus 7.3.2
A netting agreement lets a bank offset what it owes a counterparty against what the counterparty owes it, so only the net amount is claimed if the counterparty fails. Without it, the bank must pay what it owes in full but only claim recovery on the gross amount it is owed.
- 1 With netting (Phoenix): net claim = 100 − 60 = $40m. Recovery = 40% × 40 = $16m inflow.
- 2 Without netting (Vapour): Delta pays the $60m it owes, and claims $100m gross. Recovery = 40% × 100 = $40m.
- 3 Net cash = 40 − 60 = $20m outflow. The same $40m asset becomes a $16m inflow with netting but a $20m outflow without it, a $36m difference.
Market dislocation syllabus 7.3.3
Normally, lower prices attract more buyers. At certain points in the cycle, markets stop clearing at any price: when liquidity disappears, no one will lend regardless of price. This is market dislocation. Behaviour of banks and central banks becomes unpredictable: however low the central bank sets rates, banks may not lend to each other; inter-bank rates may even rise while rates fall; banks may hoard the central bank's liquidity rather than lend it on, fearing insolvency if short-term funding runs short.
Implications:
- Companies find borrowing harder, so more fail, worsening conditions and cutting bank profits further.
- Consumers cannot obtain mortgages, prolonging falls in house prices.
- Central banks lose interest rates as their main lever: rates can only fall to zero, after which the economy risks deflation.
7.9 Ch 7 cheat sheet
▼All the definitions + numbers
| Item | Answer |
|---|---|
| Liquidity risk | Insufficient cash to meet obligations: insolvency or losses from borrowing, fire sales or penalties |
| Northern Rock | Long-term mortgages funded by short-term wholesale; markets froze 9 Aug (2007); queues; nationalised |
| Maturity ladder | Compares inflows and outflows by date; cumulative net excess or deficit |
| Day-one example | Inflows 180, outflows 100, excess 80 |
| Why ladder is incomplete | Derivatives are unpredictable; credit risk; business may not hold to maturity |
| Asset liquidity | Sell or pledge assets; linked to market and credit risk |
| Funding liquidity | Liability side; funding not available when needed |
| Cash matched | Every inflow offset by an outflow on the same date and vice versa |
| Gap analysis example | Gaps 0, +140, 0, −10, 0; ignores credit risk; cannot handle options |
| Four asset-liquidity measures | Bid-offer spread, market depth, immediacy, resilience |
| Spread ratio | Spread / mid-price; smaller = more liquid |
| Resilience | Speed prices return to equilibrium after a large trade |
| Management process | Contractual position, normal behaviour, stress test, compare to appetite and profit goals |
| UK regime | ILAA |
| Fund tools | Gates (limit redemptions); side pockets (no redemptions) |
| Three scenarios | Going concern; bank-specific crisis; general market crisis |
| Day-one scenario results | +80, (40), (90) |
| Timing rule | Inflows later, outflows earlier |
| LaR | Liquidity at Risk: historic funding-requirement distribution, confidence levels |
| Funding sources | Wholesale markets, securitisation, retail deposits, central bank facilities |
| Netting example | With: $16m inflow. Without: $20m outflow |
| Market dislocation | Markets do not clear at any price; central bank rate lever lost; deflation risk |