9.1 Corporate governance and the principal oversight functions
▼What corporate governance is chapter summary
A company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders. The board of directors runs it day to day and must secure its success and compliance with rules such as financial reporting, health and safety, employment law, tax and corporate governance. A director is defined by what they do, not their job title: someone not formally appointed but acting as, or in a role equivalent to, a director can be treated as one (the workbook calls this a "nominee" or "shadow" director).
Directors are accountable to shareholders for their stewardship. Corporate governance is the mechanism that ensures the company is run in the best long-term interests of its shareholders. Typical structures: the board itself, a risk committee, an audit committee and a remuneration committee. Ethics are strongly shaped by the culture the board sets, reinforced by committees and management.
The board's risk responsibilities syllabus 9.1.1
The board's typical risk duties:
- proper financial oversight, including adequate financial resources;
- determining the approach to risk, including setting or approving the risk appetite;
- setting and instilling the right culture;
- monitoring exposure to risks that could undermine strategy, reputation or long-term viability;
- identifying the risks inherent in the business model and strategy, including external factors;
- overseeing the effectiveness of management's mitigation processes and controls;
- ensuring effective crisis management processes.
The risk committee syllabus 9.1.1
Most banks and financial firms have the board delegate risk management to a risk committee. It is obligatory for larger firms; smaller firms often set one up as good practice. It typically:
- ratifies key risk management policies and procedures;
- monitors their effectiveness; and
- translates the board-approved risk appetite into limits flowing down through executive officers, business divisions and sub-committees.
A typical firm has a senior (group) risk committee plus junior (divisional) committees for specific risks (credit, market) that report up to it. Investment managers may add committees for fund risks, with the main committee focused on firm risks. The board's risk committee independently reviews the identification, measurement, monitoring and control of all risk types, including adequacy of policies and systems.
Regulatory oversight syllabus 9.1.1
The regulator is itself a key oversight function. For larger firms this includes lengthy, in-depth on-site visits covering all important aspects of how the firm is run. Even smaller firms send the regulator detailed reports on risk and capital management through the internal capital and liquidity assessment processes (Chapter 2).
9.2 Structural framework: from board to desk
▼Who sets the amount of risk syllabus 9.1.1
The risk committee recommends to the board an amount at risk (risk appetite or tolerance) that is prudent to approve. It determines the amount of:
| Category | Includes |
|---|---|
| Financial risk | Market, credit, liquidity and investment risk |
| Non-financial risk | Operational and strategic risk |
The board approves the risk appetite each year based on a broad set of risk measures and delegates oversight to the risk committee. Typical membership: a non-executive director (NED) as chair, the chief risk officer (CRO), the chief financial officer (CFO), the chief investment officer (CIO) for investment managers, possibly a risk representative from a parent firm, and other NEDs. It may hold an annual strategic risk scenario identification workshop.
The CRO and the delegation chain syllabus 9.1.1
The risk committee delegates to the CRO the authority to make decisions on its behalf, set business-level risk limits, and approve risks above those limits within the board's overall limits. The CRO is responsible for the risk management strategy, risk policies and methodologies, and ensuring the firm's infrastructure supports risk management objectives. The committee reviews and approves each business unit's limits (say annually) and delegates monitoring to the CRO, who may order business units to reduce or close out positions, or advise fund managers to do so, over market, liquidity, credit, operational or other concerns.
Below that, risk monitoring is delegated down the business: at an investment bank the head of global trading is responsible for the risk and performance of trading, delegating limit management to business managers, who in turn delegate limits to traders.
| Committee | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Fund / asset-type risk sub-committees (investment managers) | Let fund managers explain strategies and present their risk profile for challenge; organised by asset type (bonds, equities, property) or risk type (credit, liquidity, market) |
| Operational risk / controls committee | Business and risk staff together ensure decisions match desired risk/reward trade-offs and financial and operational risks are managed at department level; reviews department assessments, and losses or KRIs breaching escalation thresholds, for trends and preventative action |
Arrangements vary by firm; the key is committees with clear terms of reference covering each common area of the business.
9.3 The three lines of defence
▼First, second and third line syllabus 9.1.2
| Line | Who | Role |
|---|---|---|
| 1st | Business management and staff | Own and manage risk day to day: policies and procedures, responsibility and accountability for assessing, controlling and managing risk |
| 2nd | Independent risk functions, including compliance | Work with the business to support and challenge; help set risk appetite and strategy, define risk reporting and ensure risk mitigation is adequate |
| 3rd | Internal audit | Independent assurance over the first and second lines, and the appropriateness and effectiveness of policy implementation and internal controls |
9.4 Key challenges and implementation
▼The risk manager's role syllabus 9.1.3
Two groups take risk: strategic risk-takers (CEO and board) and tactical risk-takers in the front office (Chapter 1). Risk managers facilitate communication between the two: enabling strategic risk-takers to communicate downwards through policies, procedures and limits, and tactical risk-takers to communicate upwards through risk reports. Traders and fund managers decide what risks to take; risk managers measure and report.
Three implementation challenges syllabus 9.1.3
| Challenge | Key points |
|---|---|
| Authority and autonomy | The CRO should be independent of line management, and so should the reporting lines of all risk staff, or they are not truly autonomous. Ideally risk-takers have no input to the appraisal, pay or promotion of risk managers, who might otherwise fear giving bad news. |
| Segregation of duties | Risk managers do not take risks for the firm and do not advise which risks to take; they may have personal lending authority to approve risks the business underwrites, and should suggest suitable mitigants within risk appetite. If they start taking or advising on risks, the separation blurs. A view in the workbook: staff should not switch between risk management and risk-taking, or risk staff may worry more about a future front-office move than objective reporting. |
| Relationship to the business | Segregation puts risk managers and senior managers one step removed from the business. They should keep close via good management information plus walking the floor and talking to staff at the coalface. |
Implementation is never finished syllabus 9.1.3
Risk governance is not a one-off exercise. Corporate changes must take account of the current structure and any upgrades needed. Planned changes, such as acquiring and merging a firm, need thought on merging governance structures and managing gaps and overlaps. For unplanned changes, such as senior managers leaving, succession plans must exist for every member of key committees; a plan may reveal roles with no obvious successor, giving the chance to prepare one or, for NEDs, to build relationships with future candidates.
9.5 Risk culture: policies, appetite, transparency
▼Policies that enable a risk culture syllabus 9.2.1
Good risk management starts with culture. A risk-focused structure means risk is taken seriously and seen to be taken seriously, and written policies must reinforce it. The workbook lists key enabling policies as questions a firm should ask:
| Policy | The test |
|---|---|
| Ownership and management involvement | Individual accountability, for example the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) |
| Remuneration | Is pay linked to risk management? |
| Appraisal | Is risk management a key objective, with accountability across the institution? |
| Risk policy | Comprehensive at all levels yet short enough to read; easily available; is reading required? |
| Independence of risk function | How independent is the CRO, and how much authority? |
| Calibre of risk personnel | Willingness to pay for quality people with people skills; sufficient resources are a duty of senior management and ultimately the board |
| Escalation and whistle-blowing | Clearly defined and made as easy as possible for reporting bad news |
| Code of conduct | Responsibilities, behaviours and ethical standards expected of all |
Risk appetite as a governance tool syllabus 9.2.1
Senior management should adopt, and periodically affirm, the risk appetite: the type and amount of risk the firm will accept in pursuing its objectives. This means understanding the current risk profile and trends (the current implicit appetite) and monitoring performance against the desired appetite. The board should understand the outline of the appetite and assure itself that management has properly considered risks and applied appropriate processes and resources.
Appetite must connect to business strategy and the capital plan. Because planning is driven by earnings goals, the risk function must join planning from the start so targets can be tested against appetite and downsides assessed, and appetite and risk position must be clearly communicated to the right staff.
Transparency: external and internal syllabus 9.2.1
External. In 2015 the Bank for International Settlements updated its corporate governance principles for banks. Principle 12 (Disclosure and transparency): governance should be adequately transparent to shareholders, depositors, other stakeholders and market participants. Public disclosure (website or annual report) is recommended on six topics:
- Board structure and senior management structure (for example membership, selection, qualifications, other directorships, independence criteria, material interests).
- Basic ownership structure (including, for a state-owned bank, its state-ownership policy).
- Organisational structure (chart, business lines, subsidiaries, committees).
- Incentive structure (remuneration policies, executive pay, bonuses, stock options).
- Code of conduct or ethics, governance codes and how implemented, plus a board self-assessment against it.
- Conflicts of interest policy, including matters where board or senior management have material interests.
Internal. Risks can be uncovered and dealt with quickly only with good, open communication and no public blame for specific incidents. Mistakes are chances to learn, so keep a robust database of losses and near misses with cause, cost and action to prevent recurrence. Senior managers must prevent a blame culture: sacking or reprimanding staff during incident management makes people cover up problems later. Poor general performance should instead be caught early by the appraisal process, and staff should feel it is right to admit mistakes.
9.6 Ethics, education, silos and moral hazard
▼Integrity, ethics and education syllabus 9.2.1
Integrity, ethics and social responsibility. A financial firm's brand and franchise value rest on its reputation, which rests on core values: integrity, trust, confidentiality, fairness and professionalism. Firms thrive when they account for all stakeholders: clients, employees, shareholders, any parent, service providers, government authorities, regulators and other users of the environment they operate in.
Education and development. Education runs from the boardroom to the front line. Boards need the means to understand risk appetite and performance against it; staff need to understand where their role fits in the overall process.
Adding value and avoiding the silo effect syllabus 9.2.2
These culture techniques are not cheap, but without them the firm becomes compartmentalised: each person cares only about their own area because of a lack of shared vision, resources, communication and knowledge. This is the silo effect.
Risk management is more than a methodology and set of tools; it is a way of doing business that extracts the greatest value from opportunities without jeopardising existing value. When staff see why their work matters and how it fits with others', ownership and professional care grow: staff anticipate problems and take personal responsibility for speedy resolution.
Moral hazard syllabus 9.2.2
Moral hazard is the possibility that people behave differently when protected from the effects of the risks they take. The workbook's everyday example: a driver with car insurance may be less careful because the insurer bears the damage.
In a firm it exists whenever staff stand to gain from behaviour that does not benefit the company or breaches policy or risk strategy. Examples range from careless data entry to taking excessively high risks knowing that bonuses must be paid before the risk crystallises. It can be moderated by fostering honesty and care: stressing ethical decisions, rewarding ethical behaviour, and defining a formal Code of Conduct of company values and expected behaviour.
9.7 Ch 9 cheat sheet
▼All the roles + lists
| Item | Answer |
|---|---|
| Corporate governance | Mechanism ensuring the firm is run in the long-term interests of shareholders |
| Director | Defined by function, not title (nominee or shadow director) |
| Typical committees | Risk, audit, remuneration |
| Board risk duties | Financial oversight, appetite, culture, monitor exposure, business-model risks, controls, crisis management |
| Risk committee | Ratify policies, monitor effectiveness, turn appetite into limits |
| Risk committee chair | Non-executive director |
| Risk committee members | NED chair, CRO, CFO, CIO (investment firms), other NEDs |
| Appetite approval | Committee recommends; board approves annually |
| Financial risks set | Market, credit, liquidity, investment |
| Non-financial risks set | Operational, strategic |
| CRO delegated powers | Decide, set business limits, approve excesses within board limits, order positions reduced |
| First line | Business owns and manages risk |
| Second line | Independent risk and compliance: support and challenge |
| Third line | Internal audit: independent assurance |
| Implementation challenges | Authority and autonomy; segregation of duties; relationship to the business |
| Risk managers must not | Take risks or advise which to take |
| Enabling policies | SM&CR, pay, appraisal, risk policy, independence, calibre, whistle-blowing, code of conduct |
| BIS 2015 Principle 12 | Disclosure and transparency (six topics) |
| Six BIS disclosures | Board and senior management, ownership, organisation, incentives, code of conduct, conflicts policy |
| Internal transparency | Open communication, no public blame, loss and near-miss database |
| Silo effect | Staff care only about their own area for lack of shared vision and communication |
| Moral hazard | Behaving differently when protected from the risk's consequences |